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Abstract
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Although a high rate of urbanization and a high 
incidence of rural poverty are two distinct features of 
many developing countries, there is little knowledge 
of the effects of the former on the latter. Using a large 
sample of Indian districts from the 1983–1999 period, 
the authors find that urbanization has a substantial and 
systematic poverty-reducing effect in the surrounding 
rural areas. The results obtained through an instrumental 
variable estimation suggest that this effect is causal in 
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nature and is largely attributable to the positive spillovers 
of urbanization on the rural economy rather than to the 
movement of the rural poor to urban areas. This rural 
poverty-reducing effect of urbanization is primarily 
explained by increased demand for local agricultural 
products and, to a lesser extent, by urban-rural 
remittances, the rural land/population ratio, and rural 
nonfarm employment. 
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The transformation from an agricultural and mainly rural economy to an 
industrial and predominantly urban economy is a typical feature of the process of 
economic development (Lewis 1954; Kuznets 1955). During this process, as urban 
areas grow, so does the productivity of their workers as a result of denser and larger 
markets for goods and production factors (Fujita et al. 1999; Duranton and Puga 
2004). However, whether the welfare gains from this process have any implications 
for welfare in surrounding rural areas and the extent of such gains are not clear. These 
questions have been important in the analysis of the structural transformation in 
developed countries during the industrial revolution (Bairoch 1988; Williamson 1990; 
Allen 2009). However, only a few studies have investigated these issues in the context 
of today’s developing countries (Dercon and Hoddinot (2005) is an exception), and 
little quantification is available for the effects of urbanization on rural poverty. In a 
period of increasing urbanization in most developing countries, the answers to these 
questions may have important implications for development policies.  
This paper represents one of the first efforts to fill this gap by identifying and 
measuring the impact of urbanization on rural poverty in a large developing country. 
The relevance of the analysis is underscored by the fact that most of the world’s poor 
reside in rural areas, where the incidence of poverty is higher than in urban areas 
across all developing regions. In 1993, rural areas accounted for 62 percent of the 
world population and 81 percent of the world’s poor at the $1/day poverty line. In 
2002, after a period of intensive urbanization, the same figures stood at 58 percent and 
76 percent, respectively (Ravallion et al. 2007).1 The recent process of urbanization 
(which mostly involves the developing world) has been accompanied by an unequal 
distribution of the global reduction in poverty rates. Between 1993 and 2002, although 
the number of $1/day poor in rural areas declined by 100 million, the number of urban 
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poor increased by 50 million. Ravallion et al. (2007) explain this “urbanization of 
poverty” through two related effects. First, a large number of rural poor migrated to 
urban areas, thus ceasing to be rural poor, and they were either lifted out of poverty in 
the process or became urban poor. We define this effect as a location effect because it 
results from allocating the same people into different categories (i.e., rural vs. urban). 
Second, the process of urbanization also affects the welfare of those who remain in 
rural areas through urban-rural linkage effects. We call this effect an economic 
linkage effect. 
No direct evidence is available on the relative importance of these two types of 
effects, but distinguishing between the location and the economic linkage effects is 
important. The former involves no structural links between urbanization and rural 
poverty and entails variation in rural poverty simply due to the change in residency 
from rural areas to cities of some of the rural poor. However, the economic linkage 
effects capture the impact of urban population growth on the rural rate of poverty. 
This relationship is structural in nature and indicates how good or bad urbanization is 
for rural poverty. Understanding this relationship is particularly important in 
developing countries because most of their population will continue to be rural for at 
least another decade—and for another three decades in the least developed countries.2 
This figure, along with the recognition that poverty has a higher incidence in rural 
than in urban areas, suggests that the implications of urbanization will be most 
important in the near future for global poverty reduction among this rural nonmigrant 
population. The focus on developing countries is essential, given that almost all of the 
future population growth in urban areas (94 percent from 2005 to 2030) is predicted to 
occur in developing countries (UN 2008).  
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We measure the impact of urbanization on rural poverty in surrounding rural 
areas, distinguishing between the location and the economic linkage effects, using a 
large sample of Indian districts for the 1983–1999 period. During this period, the 
country urbanized at a relatively slow rate: the urban population was 23.3 percent of 
the total in 1981 and 27.8 percent of the total in 2001 (Government of India 2001). 
However, given the sheer size of the Indian population, this moderate increase 
translates into a massive rise in the absolute number of urban dwellers (126 million). 
This number represents an increase of almost 80 percent in the urban population over 
this period. These figures mask large variability in urbanization patterns at the sub-
national level; in particular, districts have urbanized at very different rates (figure 
S3.1a in the supplemental appendix, available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/). For 
instance, a district such as Idukki in Kerala increased its urban population by 13,000 
(+29 percent) between 1981 and 2001, whereas the urban population increased by 1.6 
million (+416 percent) in Rangareddi (Andhra Pradesh) and by 2.4 million (+130 
percent) in Pune (Maharashtra) over the same period. In the subsequent analysis, we 
attempt to exploit this variability to identify the impact of urbanization on rural 
poverty. 
India also provides an interesting case in terms of the policy environment and 
economic performance given the structural changes in economic policy, the rate of 
growth, and the poverty levels experienced by the country during this period. Despite 
disagreements regarding the extent to which economic growth increased the welfare 
of India’s poor, poverty in India declined steadily in the 1990s, particularly in rural 
areas (Kijima and Lanjouw 2003). The geography of the decrease in the share of the 
poor, however, is extremely varied (figure S3.1b in the supplemental appendix, 
available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/). Although over 30 percent of the rural 
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population was lifted out of poverty in many districts between 1983 and 1999, for 
approximately a quarter of the districts, the incidence of poverty has remained roughly 
constant or has worsened over the same period. 
India is the country with the largest number of both rural and urban poor. 
India’s number of $1/day rural poor in 2002 was over 316 million, representing 36 
percent of the world’s rural poor. The country is expected to add a further 280 million 
urban dwellers by 2030.3 Thus, estimating the impact of urbanization on rural poverty 
in India can help to identify the potential effects of this expected growth of the urban 
population on the world’s largest stock of rural poor. Our results suggest that urban 
growth has a significant poverty-reducing effect in rural areas within the same district, 
explaining between 13 percent and 25 percent of the overall decrease in rural poverty 
over the period. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section identifies the 
possible channels through which urban population growth affects rural poverty. 
Section two describes the data used. Section three details the empirical methodology 
employed, including the variables used and the strategy to distinguish location and 
economic linkage effects. Section four presents the results, and section five concludes. 
 
<<A>>Urban-rural linkages  
We can draw from existing theoretical and empirical insights to identify the main 
mechanisms underlying the economic linkage effects of urbanization on economic 
conditions in nearby rural areas. There are at least six channels through which urban 
population growth can affect rural poverty in surrounding areas: consumption 
linkages, rural nonfarm employment, remittances, the rural land/labor ratio, rural land 
prices, and consumer prices. 
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<<B>>Consumption linkages 
An expanding urban area will generate an increase in the demand for rural 
goods. This channel is likely to operate via an income effect as well as a substitution 
effect. The income effect is related to increased demand for agricultural goods due to 
higher (nominal) incomes in urban areas relative to rural areas. This phenomenon was 
documented as early as the Industrial Revolution; Allen (2009) describes how trade 
and proto-industrialization in British cities increased the urban consumption of goods 
produced in the countryside. This higher income is explained by urbanized 
economies: urban areas have denser markets for products and factors, which increase 
labor productivity and wage levels over the levels of rural areas (Duranton and Puga, 
2004). The substitution effect is related to the increased share of higher value-added 
products in total agricultural demand that is typical of more sophisticated urban 
consumers. Empirical evidence from India and Vietnam confirms this composition 
effect (Parthasarathy Rao et al. 2004; Thanh et al. 2008). As noted below, we expect 
these effects to grow stronger closer to urban areas as a result of the weakly integrated 
agricultural markets within India (Jha et al. 2005).  
<<B>>Rural nonfarm employment 
Expanding urban areas can also favor the diversification of economic activity 
away from farming, which typically has a positive effect on income (e.g., Berdegue et 
al. 2001; Lanjouw and Shariff 2002; Jacoby and Minten 2009). This effect is 
particularly important in the rural areas surrounding the cities. Three concomitant 
effects can explain this increased diversification. First, proximity to cities may allow 
some of the peripheral urban workforce to commute to the city to work. Commuting, 
in turn, generates suburban nonfarm jobs in services, such as consumer services and 
retail trade, which are needed by the growing commuter population. Second, because 
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cities provide dense markets to trade goods and services more efficiently, rural 
households close to cities can afford to specialize in particular economic activities 
(because of their comparative advantage), relying on the market for their other 
consumption and input needs (Fafchamps and Shilpi 2005; Dercon and Hoddinot 
2005). This more extensive specialization is likely to boost productivity and income 
(Becker and Murphy 1992). Third, proximity to urban areas stimulates the nonfarm 
activities that are instrumental to agricultural trade (which is increased by 
urbanization), such as transport and marketing. Recent evidence from Asia provides 
strong support for the effect of cities in stimulating high-return nonfarm employment 
in nearby rural areas (Fafchamps and Shilpi 2003; Fafchamps and Wahba 2006; 
Deichmann et al. 2008; Thanh et al. 2008).  
<<B>>Remittances  
Remittances sent to rural households of origin by rural-urban migrants 
constitute another potentially important economic linkage effect of urbanization on 
rural poverty. The vast majority of rural-urban migrants (between 80 percent and 90 
percent) send remittances home, with varying proportions of income and frequency 
(Ellis 1998). To the extent that urbanization is (partly) fuelled by rural-urban 
migration, this growth may be associated with larger remittance flows to the rural 
place of origin. Stark (1980) and Stark and Lucas (1988) provide evidence in support 
of the positive effects of remittances in reducing resource constraints for rural 
households and providing insurance against adverse shocks (because their income is 
uncorrelated with the risk factors of agriculture).4  
<<B>>Rural land/labor ratio  
Urbanization and rural poverty may also be linked through the changes in the 
rural labor supply that accompany the urbanization process. To the extent that rural-
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urban migration reduces the rural labor supply, this reduction would increase (reduce 
the decrease of) the land available per capita in rural areas. Given a fixed land supply 
and diminishing marginal returns to land, this increased availability should increase 
labor productivity in agriculture, creating some upward pressure on rural wages.5 
There is evidence in India of an association between out-migration from rural areas 
and higher wages in the sending areas (Jha 2008).6 
<<B>>Rural land prices 
The growth of cities can increase prices of agricultural land (owned by 
farmers) in nearby rural areas as a result of greater demand for agricultural land for 
residential purposes. This increase may generate increased income for landowners 
through sale or lease or through enhanced access to credit markets, where land acts as 
collateral. Some evidence from the US indicates that the expected (urban) 
development rents are a relatively large component of the agricultural land values in 
US counties that are near or that contain urban areas (Plantinga et al. 2002). The 
consumption linkage channel of urbanization described above can also be expected to 
increase land rental prices as a result of a rise in the expected future stream of income 
from agriculture. The impact on rural poverty through this channel depends on how 
this increased income is distributed across the rural population. Typically, if land is 
very concentrated, this channel is likely to benefit a few landowners, potentially 
restricting access to waged agricultural employment for the landless population. 
Given the constraints on the reallocation of agricultural labor across sectors and the 
high labor intensity of agriculture, we would expect the net effect on rural poverty to 
be adverse (i.e., an increase in rural poverty) when land is highly concentrated (and 
vice versa). 
<<B>>Consumer prices  
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Because the growth of a city is associated with lower consumer prices, 
surrounding rural consumers who have access to urban markets may benefit through 
higher real wages (Jacoby 2000). This effect may be due to increased competition 
among a larger number of producers in the growing urban area as well as thicker 
market effects in both factor and goods markets (Fujita et al. 1999). However, the 
increased demand for agricultural goods may also lead to higher prices for these 
goods, especially if the supply is fairly inelastic. Therefore, the direction of the net 
effect of urbanization on consumer prices is a priori ambiguous.  
This study predicts that the total net effect of urbanization on rural poverty is 
poverty reducing. Moreover, the bulk of the effect is expected to be felt in rural areas 
that are relatively close to the growing urban area. This distance decay effect is 
consistent with recent research on the welfare impact of the expansion of a gold mine 
in Peru (Aragόn and Rud 2009) and is important for our identification strategy, as 
explained below. The next sections will detail the methodology used to test these 
hypotheses by measuring the total net effect in the case of Indian districts. 
 
<<A>>Data  
The data for the empirical analysis come from three main sources. For the 
district-level measures of poverty, we use data from three “thick” rounds of the 
National Sample Surveys (NSS: the Indian household survey) spanning the 1980s and 
the 1990s, the 38th (1983–84), 49th (1993–94) and 55th (1999–2000) rounds of the 
NSS.7,8 These measures have been adjusted by Topalova (2010) in two ways. First, 
she uses the poverty lines (based on the state-level prices computed separately for 
rural and urban areas) proposed by Deaton (2003a, 2003b) instead of the standard 
Indian Planning Commission poverty lines, which are based on defective price 
indices. Second, she adjusts the consumption data from the 55th round to 
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accommodate for a change in the survey design vis-à-vis the previous rounds (i.e., the 
recall period for certain goods).9  
We are aware that the reliability of the district-level estimates of urban poverty 
is widely debated in light of the relatively small number of sampled households 
(Hasan et al. 2007; Topalova 2010). Although we use the urban poverty measure at 
the district level, the results are also robust to using urban poverty at the level of the 
NSS regions, which are a census-based aggregation of several districts (there are 
approximately 60 NSS regions in India).10 To the extent that the limited 
representativeness at the district level can be considered a classic nonsystematic 
measurement error in the dependent variable, it should not bias the estimate of the 
coefficients. It only suggests lower efficiency.  
The other district-level data, such as population composition, come from the 
Indian districts database at the University of Maryland (which has been extracted 
from the original data in the Indian Census), which we update to 2001 using data from 
the Indian Census.11 Data on town populations are available from various rounds of 
the Indian Census. In addition, for crop production volumes and values, we use the 
district-level database for India, available from the International Crops Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics from 1980 to 1994 and recently updated to 1998 
by Parthasarathy Rao et al. (2004).12 
The district classification was modified during the period of analysis because 
some districts were split into two units. Topalova (2010) created a consistent 
classification by aggregating the 2001 districts that originated from the district 
division of 1987. We conform to this reaggregation and modify the original 
population and demographic data accordingly. 
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<<A>>Empirical strategy 
We attempt to systematically assess whether and to what extent the 
urbanization in Indian districts during the 1983–1999 period affected rural poverty in 
these districts. We argue that districts are an appropriate spatial scale for such an 
analysis in India because all of the location and economic linkage channels described 
above are likely to display most of their effects within a district’s boundaries. This 
argument is consistent with the theoretical discussion above suggesting that the effects 
of city growth are concentrated in surrounding rural areas. Specific evidence on India 
confirms that this relationship is likely to be the case. 
First, intradistrict migration in India is a large component of total rural-urban 
migration. According to the census (Government of India 1991), 62 percent of the 
total stock of permanent internal migrants was intradistrict in 1991, although a share 
of this stock was composed of women migrating for marriage reasons.13 This statistic 
does not deny the existence of long-distance migration in India, which increased 
during the 1990s (Jha 2008). However, long-distance rural-urban migration is 
primarily directed at a few growing metropolitan areas, such as Mumbai, Delhi, 
Bangalore, and Chennai, which are excluded from the analysis for this reason.14 
Notwithstanding the importance of intradistrict migration, in the empirical section, we 
test the robustness of the results against the relative size of the intradistrict migrant 
population.  
Second, during the period of analysis, most agricultural goods markets do not 
appear to be well integrated at the national or even at the state level in India. The 
extremely poor transport infrastructure is one of the largest obstacles to trading bulky 
agricultural goods throughout the country (Atkin 2010). Furthermore, India maintains 
high internal food-trade barriers, including tariffs at state borders, licensing 
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requirements for traders and district-level entry taxes (Das-Gupta 2006). Thus, a 
consistent share of agricultural trade tends to occur at a short distance, making 
districts a suitable spatial scale to capture a substantial part of the first two channels. 
Consistent with these ideas, some studies have tried to capture the demand-side 
effects on agriculture through district-level analyses (Parthasarathy Rao et al. 2004). 
There is also emerging evidence of increases in land prices in peri-urban and 
rural areas surrounding the urban agglomerates. The land values in these areas may be 
well above the discounted future stream of income from agricultural activity, inducing 
some landowners to sell the land (Jha 2008).15 
We begin from the following basic specification: 
dtdt
U
jdtstd
R
dt XPH εχβλα ++++= − ,  (1) 
where RdtH  is a measure of rural poverty in district d at time t, α is the district fixed 
effect, λ is the state-year fixed effect, U jdtP − is the urban population of district d at time 
t-j (where ]2,1[∈j ), and X is a vector of controls that includes other variables that are 
likely to have an independent impact on rural poverty, including, inter alia, the 
district’s rural population to control for the growth of the district’s overall population. 
The coefficient of interest here is β, which measures the collective impact of the 
location and economic linkage effects of urbanization on rural poverty. 
We use a standard Foster Greer Thorbecke (FGT) measure of poverty for RdtH , 
the poverty headcount ratio. U jdtP − , the main independent variable, is computed as
∑
=
−=
dN
i
d
jit
U
dt uP
1
, where d jitu −  is the population of town i in district d at time t-j and Nd is 
the number of cities in district d. Because population figures from the census are 
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available with only a 10-year frequency (e.g., 1981, 1991, 2001), the data for 1997 are 
estimated through nonlinear interpolation.16  
The two sets of fixed effects included in (1) absorb some of the unobserved 
heterogeneity likely to bias the estimation. In particular, the district fixed effects 
absorb any time-invariant component at the district level, such as geographical 
position, climatic factors, and natural resources. The state-year fixed effects capture 
any state-specific time-variant shocks (including economic dynamics and policies). 
This specification, however, may not completely account for other sources of 
potential bias in the coefficient β, including endogeneity. For this reason, in the next 
section, we address a number of possible remaining concerns by means of several 
robustness tests and instrumental variable (IV) estimations. 
<<B>>Disentangling economic linkage from location effects 
As mentioned above, it is important to empirically distinguish the economic 
linkage effects from the simple composition effect due to the migration of the poor 
from rural to urban areas (location effects) when identifying the impact of 
urbanization on rural welfare. To disentangle these effects, we start from the 
observation that a district’s urban population grows more rapidly than the rural 
population because of two phenomena: intradistrict rural-urban migration or rural 
areas becoming urban (either because they are encompassed by an expanding urban 
area or because their population has grown sufficiently to upgrade from the status of 
village to that of town).17 These two phenomena directly change the composition of 
both the rural and the urban populations, including their poverty rates. If the 
distribution of rural-urban migrants is skewed toward low-income individuals (i.e., the 
incidence of poverty is higher among migrants than nonmigrants) and if the poverty 
incidence in rural villages that become urban is higher than it is in the total rural 
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population of the district, then rural-urban migration will directly reduce rural 
poverty. This example demonstrates the poverty-reducing location effect of urban 
growth.  
To properly isolate the location effects of urbanization on rural poverty, we 
need representative data on the poverty profile of rural-urban migrants and the 
dwellers in areas that are rural at time t-1 and that become urban at time t. 
Unfortunately, these data are not available for the Indian context. Thus, we must find 
indirect proxies for this information.18  
We use two sets of variables for this purpose. The first set is composed of 
three rural socio-demographic variables: the number of rural people in the 15–34 year 
age group, the share of literates in this group, and the share of the rural population 
classified as scheduled caste. The rationale behind the inclusion of these variables as 
proxies for the location effects of urbanization relies on the assumption that the 
poverty distribution of migrants can be expressed as a function of the migrants’ age, 
literacy, and caste composition. Other things being equal, the incidence of poverty 
tends to be lower among young adults (i.e., 15–34 years old) because they represent 
the most productive age class.19 Therefore, the higher the share of young adults in the 
total migrant population (relative to their share in the rural population), the lower the 
probability is that urbanization will directly reduce rural poverty. Because we do not 
observe the composition of the migrant population, we can only control for it 
indirectly through the composition of the actual rural population. This strategy relies 
on the plausible assumption that the change in the number of young adults in the rural 
population is inversely related to the change in their number among the rural-urban 
migrant population in the same period.20 The same argument can be applied to literate 
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migrants, whereas the reverse is true for scheduled caste members, whose poverty 
incidence is higher than that of the rest of the population. 
The second type of variable capturing the location effects of urbanization is 
the urban poverty rate. Changes in this variable should indirectly reflect the poverty 
profile of rural-urban migrants in every period. This hypothesis follows from the fact 
that the probability that poor rural-urban migrants will become urban poor (after 
migrating) is higher than the same probability for nonpoor rural-urban migrants. 
Therefore, for any given level of urban economic growth (which is the main 
determinant of urban poverty) between t and t-1, urban poverty is more likely to 
decrease between t and t-1, with a lower share of rural poor migrating to urban areas 
during that period.  
In addition, the urban poverty rate can control for some unobserved time 
varying district-specific shocks that can affect both rural poverty and the urban 
population. For example, there may be a localized shock that spurs the district’s 
economic growth. Because economic growth is generally associated with 
urbanization, this growth can foster urbanization while simultaneously reducing rural 
poverty. This omitted variable problem implies a spurious negative association 
between the two variables. The data on income per capita at the district level are not 
available to us. However, because a district’s economic growth is likely to be the 
main determinant of the evolution of urban poverty (as well as rural poverty) in that 
district, and to the extent that the poverty-reducing effects of economic growth are 
similar across urban and rural areas, the urban poverty rate is a good proxy for a 
district’s economic growth. 
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Because the main aim of this paper is to estimate the size and direction of the 
economic linkage effects of urbanization on rural poverty, we can now extend (1) to 
separately capture the location effects of urbanization: 
dtdt
U
dtdt
U
jdtstd
R
dt XHZPH εχγβλα +++Γ+++= −' ,  (2) 
where Z is the vector of socio-demographic variables described above and UdtH  is the 
urban poverty rate. To the extent that these additional variables capture the location 
effects, β’ measures only the economic linkage effects of urbanization on rural 
poverty. This coefficient should thus quantify the collective effect of the urban-rural 
linkages described in section two. Because all of these linkages point toward the rural 
poverty-reducing effect of urban growth, β’ is expected to be negative. The empirical 
analysis below attempts to disentangle the effects of some of these economic linkage 
channels. The difference between β in (1) and β’ in (2) should be an indication of the 
size and direction of the location effects of urban growth on rural poverty.  
There may be some concern that urban poverty could be endogenous in 
expression (2) because it is simultaneously determined with rural poverty. To relieve 
these concerns, we employ a variant of this specification without urban poverty that 
uses the number of urban nonpoor instead of the number of urban people as the main 
regressor:  
dtdtdt
NPU
jdtstd
R
dt XZPH εχβλα ++Γ+++= −
)('' .  (2’) 
Given the property of urban poverty discussed above, we would expect the coefficient 
of the number of urban nonpoor to more closely capture the economic linkage effects 
of urbanization on rural poverty (coefficient β’’) than the β coefficient of the total 
urban population in (1), which captures the overall effect of urbanization on rural 
poverty. We have this expectation because the urban nonpoor variable would be much 
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less affected by the quantity of poor rural-urban migrants (who are more likely to 
become urban poor, at least in the short term) than the total urban population variable. 
Again, the difference between the standardized coefficients of the total urban 
population β and of the urban nonpoor population β’’ provide a sense of the 
magnitude of the location effects. 
 
<<A>>Results 
The descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis are 
presented in table S2.1 (available online at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org). Table 1 
presents the results of specifications (2) and (2’) using fixed effects estimation. Our 
dataset includes observations of 363 districts for three different time periods: 1983, 
1993, and 1999. We run the regressions applying a two-year lag to the measure of the 
urban population and to the other demographic controls for two primary reasons. 
First, the two-year lag reduced the risk of potential simultaneity bias. Second, the two-
year lag allows us to limit the use of interpolation for the Census variables (both 
population and socio-demographic variables), which are recorded in 1981, 1991 and 
2001, to the last period (1999) only.21 The standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity (using the Huber-White correction) and are clustered at the district 
level. 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
The estimate in column 1 indicates that the growth of the urban population 
exerts a significant poverty-reducing effect on the rural areas in the same district. This 
result is obtained by including district and state-year effects as well as the total rural 
population and should capture the overall effect of urbanization on rural poverty. 
Column 2 adds the set of controls, which, as we have argued above, should capture 
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most of the location effects of urbanization. The coefficient of the urban population is 
virtually unaffected by the inclusion of these controls, suggesting that most of the 
poverty-reducing effect of urban growth is due to economic linkage effects. This 
finding is consistent with the evidence that rural-urban migrants (including those 
within the same district) enjoy, on average, similar, albeit slightly higher, 
expenditures and education levels than the rural stayers in India (Singh 2009). This 
similarity is also the case in Tanzania (Beagle et al, 2011). Even if our controls 
imprecisely capture the location effect of urbanization on rural poverty, this evidence 
suggests that our estimation would tend to underestimate the absolute magnitude of 
the economic linkage effect of urbanization on rural poverty. 
This magnitude over the 1983–1999 period is not particularly strong, 
according to our estimate. An increase in the district’s urban population of 200,000 (a 
43 percent increase from the mean value) reduces the poverty rate by approximately 
1.3 percentage points, on average. Over the period of analysis, the rural poverty rate 
decreased by approximately 20 percentage points, and the urban population increased 
by 400,000 in the average district. Therefore, urban growth is responsible for 
approximately 13 percent of the overall reduction in rural poverty in India during the 
1983–99 period.  
When we use the nonpoor urban population as the main regressor, the β1 
coefficient decreases by approximately one-third vis-à-vis the total urban population 
coefficient (column 3). However, when considering the urban nonpoor effect in 
proportionate terms, the two effects are basically identical, providing further 
confirmation that the economic linkage effects of urbanization on rural poverty drive 
the overall poverty-reducing impact of urbanization in rural areas. 
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The signs of the controls are as expected, except for the positive coefficient of 
the share of literates in the last period (i.e., post-1993), when a higher incidence of 
literates in the most productive part of the rural labor force was associated with higher 
levels of rural poverty. A higher share of young adults in the rural population 
decreases rural poverty, whereas a higher presence of scheduled caste increases it 
(although not significantly). This result suggests that the direct effect of the young 
adult population on poverty prevails over the indirect effect, which captures the rural-
urban migration of young adults. The inclusion of the controls does not significantly 
change the urban population coefficient.  
One possible concern with these results is that the demographic controls, 
including the urban population, are interpolated for the last period. To address this 
issue, we check the robustness of our results when we restrict the analysis to the first 
two periods covering the 1983–1993 time interval because no interpolation is needed 
in this case. This analysis is interesting in its own right because it focuses only on the 
preliberalization period. Overall, the effect of urbanization on rural poverty is slightly 
stronger over this period than over the entire period (columns 4 and 5), although the 
difference in the coefficients is not statistically significant. Again, the bulk of the 
effects appear to be driven by economic linkage effects (cf. column 4 vs. 5). 
Furthermore, both the share of young adults in the rural population and the share of 
literates in the young adult population are associated with a reduction of rural poverty. 
This association supports the hypothesis of a differential impact of literacy on rural 
poverty over time: it is poverty reducing until 1993 and then is poverty increasing. 
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<<B>>OLS: further robustness 
The analysis thus far does not completely account for other sources of 
potential bias in the coefficient of interest β’. Table 2 presents the results of a battery 
of tests to check the robustness of the results to a number of these possible concerns.22 
A first potential source of bias is related to the omission of agricultural 
productivity. As argued by some of the literature on structural transformation, 
agricultural productivity growth can drive both urbanization and rural poverty (e.g., 
Matsuyama 1992; Michaels et al. 2012). To address this issue, we add the measure of 
agricultural land productivity to the list of controls in column 1. The variable is 
constructed as the sum of the total value of 22 different crops produced in a given 
district divided by the area cultivated with these crops. To estimate the value, we use 
India-wide crop-specific prices instead of district prices to minimize data gaps (of 
which there are several for the latter) and the potential endogeneity of the districts’ 
prices to rural poverty.23 The variable is lagged one year because the simultaneity bias 
should not be an issue in this case, but a contemporaneous specification is not possible 
because of the lack of data for 1999. The main results are robust to the inclusion of 
this measure, which turns out to be not significant.24  
Second, a question remains regarding the extent to which the impact on rural 
poverty can be attributed to composition (urban versus rural) rather than simply to a 
scale effect. To check for this, we substitute the urban population with the share of the 
urban population in the total population as the main regressor (column 2). This 
specification is close to Ravallion et al. (2007) and yields a negative, although not 
significant, urban coefficient. This result suggests that the (economic linkage) effects 
of urbanization on rural poverty are primarily driven by a scale effect rather than a 
composition effect.  
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Third, until now, the estimation strategy has made the implicit assumption that 
the towns in a district are centrally located. However, in practice, they are neither 
centrally located nor evenly distributed within a district. This assumption could 
therefore lead to a biased estimation. For example, if a district has a large city just 
outside of its border, the relationship between rural poverty and urbanization within 
this district could simply be driven by the population growth in the city. Although we 
include district-level fixed effects and state-specific time effects in the regressions, 
this source of omitted variables may persist because of the growth of the city in the 
surrounding district over time. To address this concern, we add to the set of controls a 
spatially lagged urbanization variable, the average of the urban population of the 
contiguous districts (column 3). The results are once again unaffected, and this extra 
control is not significant.  
Fourth, a further possible bias of our analysis may be due to small villages that 
upgrade to towns in the census definition. To the extent that these growing villages 
are systematically located in rural areas where poverty is decreasing (increasing) for 
reasons independent of urbanization, we might detect a spurious negative (positive) 
effect for the urban population on the poverty share. We therefore reestimate the 
models, excluding from the urban population the variable towns with fewer than 
20,000 inhabitants, the size category that would contain most of the ‘upgraded 
villages.’ Again, the results of this regression are extremely similar, although slightly 
less precise (column 4).  
Finally, we might think that the effect of the urban population on rural poverty 
may be nonlinear. In this case, our model would be misspecified. We test whether 
nonlinearity is the case by adding the square of the urban population as an explanatory 
variable whose coefficient, however, is close to zero and not significant (column 5). 
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We also attempt different specifications, substituting the urban population variable 
with various variables corresponding to the sum of the urban population by the size 
class of the towns (we attempt a number of different size classifications). Again, all of 
these additional variables have statistically nonsignificant coefficients (results not 
shown but available from the authors upon request), leading us to conclude that the 
linear approximation is substantially adequate to identify the phenomenon under 
scrutiny. 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
<<A>> IV Estimation 
Despite addressing these concerns, the estimation of (2) could still be biased to 
the extent that the relationship between rural poverty and the urban population is 
characterized by reverse causation; the conditions in the rural sector affect 
urbanization, or there is a correlation of unobserved variables with the variable of 
interest. 
 In particular, we are concerned that rural poverty could drive rural-urban 
migration. Rural poverty could either act as a push factor (i.e., poorer people migrate 
in search of an escape from poverty), or in the presence of the high fixed costs of 
migration, it can act as a restraint to migration. If the former case dominates (i.e., 
poverty is primarily a push factor), the coefficient β’ in (2) would have a downward 
bias, whereas the opposite is true if the latter effect of poverty on migration 
dominates. The findings by Ravallion et al. (2007) that associate global rural-urban 
migration with a large reduction in the number of rural poor lends some credit to the 
prevalence of the former case. Kochar (2004) also provides indirect support for this 
hypothesis, showing that in India, landless households have the highest incidence of 
rural-urban migrants among rural households.25  
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We resort to an IV estimation to address the endogeneity bias. To that end, we 
need at least an additional variable to act as a valid instrument, one that is correlated 
with the district urban population and exogenous to the poverty-induced rural-urban 
migration flows. We identify three variables that could plausibly satisfy both 
conditions and are candidates for valid instruments.26 
The first variable is based on the fixed coefficient approach (Freeman 1980; 
Card 2001; Ottaviano and Peri 2005) and uses national levels of the urban population 
and the lagged values of its distribution across districts. This instrument builds on the 
interaction between two sources of variation, which are exogenous to changes in the 
local characteristics influencing urban population growth at the district level: the 
initial distribution of urban population across districts and the national trend in urban 
population. Similar to Card (2001), Ottaviano and Peri (2005), and Cortés (2008), we 
define the instrument for district d in year t as the share of the urban population of 
district d in the total Indian urban population in 1971 multiplied by the total urban 
population in India at time t:  
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The predicted measure defined in (3) conveys the size of the urban population 
in each district that would have been observed if the distribution of the urban 
population across districts had not changed since 1971. The fact that the initial urban 
population distribution is referred to 10 years before the beginning of our analysis 
reinforces its exogeneity to changes in the district urban populations during the period 
under scrutiny. In a cross-sectional setting, this exogeneity would not necessarily hold 
true; the unobserved structural factors driving the urban population dynamics before 
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1971 could also affect rural poverty in later periods. In our panel analysis, however, 
all of the regressions include the district fixed effects, which absorb all of the time-
invariant factors at the district level and therefore the long-term determinants of urban 
growth. The hypothesis of serial correlation in the rural poverty variable is also 
unlikely because India underwent many political, social, and economic changes in the 
1970s and 1980s, which make it extremely unlikely that the district-specific dynamics 
in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, would be serially correlated with the rural 
poverty dynamics in the 1980s and 1990s (after conditioning on state-year fixed 
effects). However, the contemporaneous India-wide trend in urban population is 
safely exogenous to the district-specific changes in rural poverty.  
Moreover, because the strategy adopted for the first instrument is not immune 
to criticism (e.g., Cortés 2008), we also employ two other instruments. The first 
additional instrument is the number of people who migrate to the urban areas of the 
district from states other than the state where the district is located. It is plausible to 
assume that rural poverty or the other push factors for migration in the other states are 
uncorrelated with the district characteristics once we control for the state-year fixed 
effects. At the same time, the number of migrants coming to district towns from other 
states is part of the urban population of the district and thus has a positive association 
with our main explanatory variable. Nevertheless, a concern about the exogeneity of 
the instrument could arise from the fact that, within a given district, the time-varying 
urban pull factors can be correlated with time-varying rural pull factors, and the latter 
can, in turn, be correlated with rural poverty. For example, migration from other states 
to the urban areas of one district could be driven by an unobserved positive shock to 
the entire district, such as an increase in government funding. This shock would help 
 25 
to reduce poverty throughout the district, effectively invalidating the exclusion 
restriction of our instrument. 
 However, the first (and second) stage of the IV estimation includes all of the 
controls listed in the ordinary least squares (OLS) specification, and some of them are 
good proxies for the pull factors of migration to the district rural areas: the measure of 
agricultural productivity, the demographic characteristics of the rural population, and 
the interaction of time and state fixed effects. To further address these concerns, we 
add the number of migrants from other states to the rural areas as a control. This 
variable should capture any district or rural district shocks driving both migration and 
poverty. The results with this additional control are nearly identical to the others.27 
Therefore, we can assume that the second IV captures the effect of migration to 
district cities from other states, conditioning out the pull factors of district rural areas. 
The last instrument is based on the recognition that the urban areas that are 
relatively more specialized in tradable sectors are more likely to reap the benefits of 
Indian economic liberalization, which greatly facilitated trade within and outside of 
India (Aghion et al. 2008; Topalova 2010). Therefore, the cities that specialized in the 
tradable sector (proxied by manufacturing) before the liberalization shock were more 
likely to experience a positive trade shock, leading to faster population growth 
(primarily through immigration). Therefore, we develop an additional instrument 
based on the interaction of the manufacturing share in urban employment in 1981 with 
a postliberalization dummy (equal to one for all the years following 1993). The 
validity of the instrument is further reinforced by the inclusion of the rural 
manufacturing share in the control set. The rural manufacturing share controls for the 
possibility that the instrument could reflect the economic structure in the district’s 
rural area, thus capturing some of the direct effect of liberalization on rural poverty. 
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Columns 1 to 5 of table 3 present the results of the estimations using these 
instruments. Because the inclusion of the three instruments together leads to a weaker 
first stage, we included the strongest ones—migrants and predicted population—in all 
regressions except column 3, in which the migration instrument is substituted with the 
postliberalization instrument. In all cases, the first-stage coefficients substantiate the 
power of the instruments, with a Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic well above the 
confidence threshold of the Stock and Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments. 
Furthermore, the test of the overidentifying restrictions (Hansen’s J, reported in the 
last two rows of table 3) supports the exclusion restriction assumptions for all IV 
specifications. Analogous to OLS, the standard errors in the IV estimations are robust 
and clustered at the district level.28  
<<Table 3 about here>> 
The results from the second-stage regressions confirm those of the OLS 
regression, including the significant reducing impact of urbanization on rural poverty 
and the fact that most of this impact is driven by economic linkage effects. The main 
difference between these regressions concerns the absolute size of the urban 
population coefficient, which is almost twice as large as the OLS estimate (and over 
twice as large in the case of the 1983–93 period). According to the IV estimation, an 
increase in the urban population of 200,000 reduces rural poverty by between 2.4 and 
2.6 percentage points, and urban growth was responsible for approximately one-
quarter of the total rural poverty reduction during the 1983–99 period. The larger 
urban coefficient in the IV estimation is consistent with our theoretical expectations. 
An attenuation bias in the OLS regression could be due to a favorable shock in rural 
areas, which reduces rural poverty, rural-urban migration, and thus the urbanization 
rate. If not controlled for, this mechanism provides a source of downward bias in the 
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absolute size of the coefficient. The larger IV coefficient could be due to 
measurement error in the endogenous variable. 
<<B>>Falsification test 
To further support the validity of our IVs, in columns 6 and 7 of table 3, we 
report a falsification test based on the assumption that we should not find an effect of 
future urban population on rural poverty in the two-stage specifications. On the 
contrary, if the coefficient of the future urban population is significant, this implies a 
district-specific trend that is correlated with both rural poverty change and 
urbanization, which makes the IV estimates inconsistent. 
Such a test, however, cannot be directly implemented because the available 
urban population is lagged two years with respect to rural poverty in the data. 
Therefore, there is a partial temporal overlap of the two variables, even if the urban 
population is referred to the subsequent period (e.g., rural poverty in 1983–1993 
regressed on the urban population in 1991–2001). Therefore, we use the 
contemporaneous variable for the years 1981 and 1991 (plus 2001 for the future urban 
population), and we extrapolate the poverty data for those years using the 38th round 
and the 43rd round of the NSS survey, conducted in 1983 and 1987, respectively. In 
this way, we are able to exploit the variation in rural poverty that does not overlap in 
time with the variation in the urban population. In all other aspects, including the 
control variables and instruments, the regressions are identical to those reported in 
column 5 of table 3.  
The results from the contemporaneous specification are qualitatively similar to 
those shown in column 5, with an even larger coefficient (−0.25), which is significant 
at the 80 percent level (the lower significance is probably due to the interpolation, 
which adds some noise to the dependent variable). When we substitute the urban 
 28 
population with the future values (10 years later), the coefficient is much smaller 
(−0.07), with standard errors that are 50 percent higher than the coefficient value 
(0.11). This finding supports the assumption that the instruments are exogenous to a 
district-specific trend, potentially affecting both urban population growth and rural 
poverty dynamics.  
<<B>>First differences estimation 
Given the importance of rigorously addressing the potential endogeneity bias 
in this type of analysis, we employ a different instrumentation strategy. We conduct 
an analysis of first differences instead of through fixed effects, regressing the change 
in rural poverty on the change in the urban population and the other control variables. 
In this way, we are able to exploit the determinants of urban growth as instruments. In 
particular, we use two determinants that have proven to be important in the literature 
(Glaeser and Shapiro 2001; Glaeser and Saiz 2004): the share of manufacturing 
employment in the urban adult population in 1971 and the historical (1931) urban 
population density. Manufacturing employment has been shown to be an important 
determinant of subsequent urban growth in societies at relatively early stages of 
industrialization, such as the United States in the first part of the 20th century (Glaeser 
et al. 1995). Manufacturing specialization became negatively associated with urban 
growth as economies moved away from industries and toward tertiary sectors, as 
occurred in the United States at the end of the last century (Glaeser and Shapiro 
2001). It is plausible that India, during the period of our analysis, could be considered 
an economy in the early days of the industrialization process, comparable to the 
United States in the first half of the 20th century. Hence, it could be supposed that 
manufacturing employment would be associated with subsequent urban growth in the 
Indian context. As we will see, these hypotheses are strongly confirmed by the data. 
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The second instrument in the first-difference estimation is the density of the 
urban population in 1931. The intuition here is that in a period of widespread 
urbanization across India, some districts were urbanizing relatively faster because 
their physical geography (e.g., terrain slope, water sources, railroads) was more 
suitable for urbanization. Because the effects of physical geography on urbanization 
are likely to be persistent over time and because these geographic factors do not 
change over time and were important for historical urbanization, the historical density 
of urban population is a good proxy for them.  
Table 4 reports the results of the estimation of first difference. The results are 
strictly comparable to the fixed effects results for the 1983–93 period. The size of the 
IV urban population coefficient triples vis-à-vis its OLS counterpart (column 3 and 4 
compared with column 1 and 2). This change is reassuringly similar to that 
experienced by the coefficient in the fixed effect regressions using a different set of 
instruments. The larger coefficients likely result because the instruments are now 
slightly weaker, although in the first-stage regression, their coefficients have the 
expected sign and are both significant. Even in this case, the Hansen test suggests that 
the instruments are correctly excluded from the second stage.  
<<Table 4 about here>> 
<<B>>Unpacking the economic linkage channels 
So far, we have established that urban growth reduces rural poverty within the 
same district and that most of this impact is driven by economic linkage channels. In 
this section, we attempt to test the extent to which some of these channels explain the 
rural poverty reduction impact of urbanization. In section 2, we identified six main 
channels: consumption linkages, rural nonfarm employment, urban-rural remittances, 
rural land/labor ratio, rural land prices, and rural consumer prices. We can construct 
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variables to proxy four of these channels, but the district data on land and consumer 
prices are not available separately for rural and urban areas. We add these variables to 
both the baseline (as defined in (2)) and the IV specifications to obtain a sense of the 
relative importance of these channels.  
To capture the consumption linkage effect of urbanization, we use crop-
specific shares of cultivated land. We interact this share at the beginning of the period 
of our analysis with the urban population variable to test the impact of urbanization 
across districts on the basis of their production dependence on specific crops. This 
measure relies on the assumption that a district’s supply is a good proxy for urban 
demand. To identify the relevant crops, we first test for the relationship between 
urbanization and the main crops across Indian districts.29 Among the crops that 
display a significant relationship, we then select the relatively large crops, those with 
a share of total cultivated land above 5 percent throughout the period. These 
cultivations are most likely to affect rural economic livelihood.  
These crops are rice (which covers, on average, 15 percent of the total 
cultivated land) and pulses (8 percent). These are important expenditure items for 
Indian households (Subramanian and Deaton, 1996). India is the world’s largest 
consumer and producer of pulses and is one of the largest consumers and producers of 
rice. This choice is reinforced by the results of Jha et al. (2005), who show that the 
rice market is not integrated within India. As shown below, our analysis suggests that 
urbanization is associated with an increase in the cultivation of rice and a decrease in 
the cultivation of pulses. Although the latter result is expected (because pulses are 
considered a relatively poor crop), the former result is surprising because rice is 
usually substituted with wheat and other food products as income rises. One reason 
that this substitution might not occur in India is that during the period of our analysis, 
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the consumption linkage of urbanization appears to operate mainly through an income 
effect (which increases the quantities of the usual crops) rather than a substitution 
effect.  
We use census data to construct the share of rural employment in 
nonagriculture/nonhousehold activities, which should capture the rural nonfarm 
employment channel.30 Again, urban-rural remittance data are not available for the 
period of this analysis; therefore, we use the number of intradistrict rural-urban 
migrants as a proxy for the remittance channel. We also include the share of rural-
urban migrants in the total rural population to control for the possible influence of 
rural poverty on migration.  
Finally, we use the total cultivated area over the rural population as a direct 
proxy for the rural land/labor ratio channel. To the extent that urbanization increases 
the demand for agricultural goods, thus raising the return on land cultivation, this ratio 
can also capture part of the consumption linkages channel.  
Column 1 in table 5 shows the coefficient of the urban population obtained by 
running specification (2) for the reduced number of observations for which all of the 
new variables are available. Adding the set of new variables brings the urban 
population coefficient to zero (column 2).31 All of the new variables have the 
expected sign, although rural nonfarm employment has a nonlinear effect on rural 
poverty. For relatively low shares of rural nonfarm employment (i.e., below 32 
percent of total rural employment), increases in this share are associated with 
increases in rural poverty, whereas the opposite is true when nonfarm/nonhousehold 
employment is greater than the 32 percent threshold. This finding suggests that rural 
nonfarm activities tend to be more profitable than agriculture only when nonfarm 
activities represent a substantial part of the rural economy. When these activities are 
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relatively marginal, they are likely to be confined to petty trading and other low-yield, 
nontradable services (such as construction and rickshaw pulling). Nonfarm activities 
appears to be relatively marginal in most Indian districts (in 1999, only 14 percent of 
the districts had a rural nonfarm share of employment above 32 percent). Most of the 
nonfarm employment involves casual employment (daily wage) and self-employment, 
which tend to be associated with lower incomes and lower stability than regular 
employment (Lanjouw and Murgai 2009). In 1999, the latter represented only one-
quarter of the rural nonfarm employment in India and was the category that grew the 
least during our period of analysis.  
The effect of internal rural-urban migrants is negative, as expected, although it 
is only significant at the 11 percent level, suggesting that a rise in the number of 
migrants is associated with a reduction in poverty through the remittance channel. 
Similarly, the cultivated area per rural population, which increases through 
urbanization, has a statistically significant poverty-reducing effect in rural areas. 
Finally, the shares of rice and pulse cultivated areas have a positive association with 
rural poverty (although it is not significant for pulses), consistent with the relatively 
small margins that are typical of these crops. However urbanization has a higher, 
albeit only weakly significant, poverty-reducing effect in districts with relatively large 
rice and pulse cultivations (i.e., consumer linkages are stronger).  
We repeat the same exercise using IV estimation. The results are almost 
identical for both the urban population and the variables’ coefficients.32 
To substantiate our claim that urbanization reduces poverty through these 
channels, columns 3 to 7 show the significant effect of the urban population variable 
on each of these variables. Using the same specification and controls as in column 2, 
 33 
we find that urbanization affects each variable positively and significantly, except for 
the share of the pulse area, which is affected negatively.  
We check the relative contribution of each channel to the poverty-reducing 
effect of urbanization by adding each variable in turn to the specification in column 1. 
According to this analysis, approximately three-quarters of the poverty-reducing 
effect of urbanization is accounted for by consumer linkages. Intradistrict rural-urban 
migration accounts for less than one-fifth, and the rural land/labor ratio and the rural 
nonfarm employment account for 4 percent and 3 percent, respectively. The small 
contribution of the latter channel is particularly surprising because rural nonfarm 
employment is often an important cause of rural poverty reduction (Berdegue et al. 
2001; Lanjouw and Shariff 2002). This surprising result could be explained by 
considering that urbanization affects rural nonfarm employment positively and that 
the latter has an inverted-U effect on rural poverty in India. 
<<Table 5 about here>> 
Taken at face value, these results suggest that the other channels that we were 
not able to properly capture (i.e., rural consumer and land prices) are not likely to 
account for any of the poverty-reducing effect of urbanization on the rural areas 
within the district. This implication seems consistent with the ambiguous effects of 
these channels on rural poverty that were discussed in section 2. 
 
<<A>>Conclusions 
 
Do the poor in rural areas benefit from the population growth in urban areas? 
If so, what is the size of the benefit? Despite the importance of these questions, little 
empirical evidence is available to provide adequate answers. We have attempted to 
address this gap by analyzing the effects of urbanization on rural poverty. Using data 
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on Indian districts from 1983 to 1999, we find that urbanization has a significant 
poverty-reducing effect on the surrounding rural areas. The results are robust to the 
inclusion of a number of controls and to the use of different types of specifications. 
The results of the IV estimation suggest that the effect is causal and that the failure to 
control for causality downwardly biases the coefficient of urbanization. We find that 
an increase in the urban population of 200,000 determines a decrease in rural poverty 
in the same district of between 1.3 (lower bound) and 2.6 percentage points.  
These figures represent between 13 percent and 25 percent of the overall 
reduction in rural poverty in India over the period. That amount is a substantial 
contribution, but it is lower than the contribution of another important change to the 
rural sector, i.e., the state-led rural bank branch expansion, which can explain 
approximately half of the overall decrease in rural poverty in India between 1961 and 
2000 (Burgess and Pande 2005).33 However, the contribution of urbanization to rural 
poverty reduction is slightly higher than that of another important state rural policy in 
post-independence India—land reform, which explains approximately one-tenth of the 
rural poverty reduction between 1958 and 1992 (Besley and Burgess 2000). 
Our analysis suggests that the poverty-reducing impact of urbanization occurs 
through economic linkage effects rather than through the direct movement of the rural 
poor to urban areas. This finding is not surprising given that rural-urban migrants 
appear to be, on average, less poor and more educated than rural nonmigrants. These 
economic linkage effects of urbanization on rural poverty are accounted for by four 
channels: consumer linkages (which explain most of these effects), urban-rural 
remittances, the changing rural land/labor ratio, and nonfarm employment. 
These findings have a number of potentially important policy implications. 
First, they can help to reassess the role of public investment in urban areas for poverty 
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reduction. In fact, it is a popular tenet that investments in developing countries should 
be concentrated in rural areas to reduce poverty because the poor in developing 
countries are primarily concentrated there (see, for instance, World Bank( 2008)). 
However, investments in rural areas are often onerous because substantial resources 
are needed to reach a population that is scattered among vast territories. To the extent 
that urbanization can have substantial poverty-reducing effects on rural areas, urban 
investments may become an important complement to rural investments in poverty-
reduction strategies. 
Second, our findings run counter to the popular myth that rural-urban 
migration may deplete rural areas, causing them to fall further behind. The relatively 
low rate of urbanization in India may be due to public policies that have not facilitated 
(and, in certain instances, have even constrained) rural-urban migration (Deshingkar 
and Start 2003). At the very least, this paper questions the appropriateness of this bias 
against rural-urban migration. 
Although this paper has not addressed the issue of urban poverty, increasing 
urban populations imply that, in the future, urban poverty may become a main issue in 
its own right (Ravallion et al. 2007). Further research is needed to assess whether the 
growth of the urban population entails a trade-off between rural and urban poverty 
reduction. 
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1 In fact, the actual poverty line used by Ravallion et al. (2007) is $1.08/day; to simplify, we refer to it 
as the $1/day poverty line. 
2 On the basis of calculations from UN (2008) data, developing countries are expected to become more 
urban than rural in 2018, as are least developed countries in 2045. 
3 This estimate is based on the authors’ calculations using UN (2008) data. 
4 The migrant’s family often provides economic support (monetary or in-kind) to the migrant during his 
initial stay in the urban area. This support, intended to cover the fixed costs of migration, can be 
interpreted as an investment whose main return is the counter urban-to-rural remittance flow that is 
received afterward (Stark 1980). This urban-to-rural remittance flow can somewhat reduce the net 
resources transferred to rural areas by urban workers. 
5 To the extent that rural-urban migration is concentrated among the most productive rural workers, this 
may counter the productivity-enhancing effect of migration. However, the incentive for highly 
productive agricultural workers to move from rural to urban areas is partly softened because the skills 
that make them productive in agriculture are not easily transferable to the urban sector. 
6 In addition, an expanding city can benefit agriculture productivity in the surrounding rural areas 
through spillover effects in technology and marketing (Dore 1987; Allen 2009). 
7 Although each survey was conducted over two years, we refer to them with the first of the two years.  
8 The “thick” surveys are conducted approximately every five years and sample a higher share of 
households than do the “thin” surveys, thus allowing inferences at the district level. We do not use the 
other “thick” survey for the period, the 43rd round (1987–88), because we only use census data for the 
population variables, which do not have a natural match with the 1987 poverty data. 
9 In particular, Topalova (2010) follows the adjustment made in Deaton (2003a and 2003b) and imputes 
the distribution of total per capita expenditure for each district from the households’ expenditures on a 
subset of goods for which the new recall period questions were not used. The poverty and average 
consumption measures were derived from this corrected distribution of consumption from the detailed 
consumption schedule of the surveys. 
10 Results are available upon request. 
11 Available at www.bsos.umd.edu/socy/vanneman/districts/codebook/index.html. 
12 The original source of these data is the Government of India, Directorate of Economic and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperation. 
13 This finding is consistent with Topalova (2005), who finds limited labor mobility across Indian 
regions between 1983 and 2000. 
14 In fact, Delhi and the urban Bangalore districts are automatically dropped because they do not have 
rural areas. In the following, we present robustness tests showing that the exclusion of Bangalore and 
Chennai increases precision but does not affect the main results of the analysis.  
15 All of this evidence appears to be roughly consistent with Fafchamps and Shilpi (2003), who find 
that in Nepal, the effects of proximity on rural areas decrease beyond a four-hour radius (in travel time) 
around the cities. Using the boundaries of the Indian districts as in 1987, the average district size in our 
analysis is approximately 7,300 km2. If we approximate the district with a circle, a city located in its 
center would be approximately 50 km from the boundary of the district. It is plausible that in several 
districts, this distance could be covered in three to four hours on rural Indian roads during the period 
considered. 
16 Appendix S1 (available online at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org) contains a detailed description of all 
of the variables included in the empirical analysis. 
17 This does not consider the possibility of interdistrict migration or of urban-rural migration. The latter 
is relatively unimportant in influencing the rural-urban split of the population in a country such as 
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India. The stock of urban-rural migrants represented less than 1.4 percent of the total population in the 
majority of Indian districts in 1991, with a mean equal to 1.7 percent (based on the Indian districts 
database at the University of Maryland; see below). The interdistrict migration represents a substantial 
share of the total migration, particularly rural-urban migration. In 1991, it accounted for less than 34 
percent of the total migration for the majority of Indian districts (with a mean equal to 37 percent). 
However, the empirical analysis below rejects the relevance of this type of migration in determining 
rural poverty.  
18 In fact, the National Sample Survey contains socio-demographic information on intradistrict rural-
urban migrants, but we cannot use this information for two reasons. First, the number is not large 
enough to be representative at the district level. Second, the survey only asks about migration in the last 
365 days, whereas we would need information on migrants in the last five years. Although we cannot 
use these data in the regressions, we nevertheless refer below to the national-level expenditure 
comparison between rural-urban migrants and stayers (Singh 2009).  
19 This pattern receives strong support in the empirical analysis that follows, which suggests that rural 
poverty is negatively associated with the rural young adult population and with the share of literates in 
this group.  
20 This assumption is supported by the results of regressing the 1981–91 change in the urban population 
in the 15–34 year age group ( UP 3415−∆ ) on the change in the rural population in the same age group (
RP 3415−∆  controlling for changes in the district’s total population and the total population in 1981). The 
coefficient of RP 3415−∆ is not statistically different from −1, indicating that changes in the rural 
population are reflected in mirrored changes in the urban population through either rural-urban 
migration or a rural-to-urban change in the status of villages (results available from the authors upon 
request).  
21 In any instance, the results are not sensitive to the change in the time lag (i.e., applying a one-year 
lag as well) (results available upon request). 
22 We show these tests only for the entire period (1983–99) and for the specification with the total 
urban population, but the results of these tests are analogous for the first period (1981–93) and the 
nonpoor urban population (results available upon request). 
23 We are aware that the quantity of agricultural goods produced in a district might also be endogenous 
to rural poverty even after controlling for a district fixed effect. However, this concern should not be 
significant for two reasons: first, the degree of endogeneity should be small given the large number of 
exogenous factors that affect agricultural productivity (e.g., climate); second, the variable is an 
accessory control that enters only a few specifications with almost no effect.  
24 This nonsignificant result is due to the negative and significant effect of the total cultivated area, that 
is, the denominator, which compensates for the negative effect of the total production value, that is, the 
numerator (results available upon request). 
25 His finding emerges in the context of the response of rural schooling decisions to the possibility of 
employment in urban areas, which tends to be the largest amongst landless households. 
26 It is worth noting that the IV estimation can also correct eventual biases arising from errors in the 
measurement of the urban population. This correction occurs if the measurement error of the 
instrument and that of the instrumented variable are independent. 
27 Not shown here; results available upon request. 
28 To obtain the covariance matrix of orthogonality conditions of full rank, which allows the calculation 
of clustered standard errors, year-state dummies are “partialled out,” and their coefficient is not 
calculated. By the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem, in IV, the coefficients for the remaining regressors 
are the same as those that would be obtained if the variables were not partialled out (Baum et al. 2008). 
29 For each of the 24 such goods for which we have data, we regress the district’s land cultivated with 
that crop over the urban population, all other control variables and the district and state-year fixed 
effects. 
30 The census divides employment into four broad sectors: agricultural laborers, cultivators, household 
industry, and other nonagricultural workers. We use the last category to construct the variable, although 
the subsequent results are also very similar when using the total nonfarm employment share, obtained 
by adding the household industry category. 
31 In fact, the coefficient becomes positive and very small but with a large standard error.  
32 Results available upon request. 
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33 This expansion was spurred by a government policy implemented between 1977 and 1990, which 
forced Indian banks to open four branches in locations with no bank branches to qualify for a license to 
open a branch in a location that already had at least one bank.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 The Effects of Urbanization on Rural Poverty, OLS  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. variable Rural poverty (headcount ratio) 
Period 1983–99 1983–99 1983–99 1983–93 1983–93 
      
Urban pop.t-2 (millions) −0.074*** −0.068***  −0.101 −0.109* 
(0.024) (0.023)  (0.063) (0.058) 
Urb. pop. nonpoor.t-2 (mil.)   −0.047***   
  (0.017)   
Rural pop. (millions) −0.010 −0.004 −0.004  0.012 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.020) 
Scheduled caste (share)  0.338 0.349  0.374 
 (0.290) (0.289)  (0.475) 
Rural pop 15–34 age 
(share)  
 −3.456*** −3.458***  −3.189** 
 (0.940) (0.944)  (1.478) 
Rural lit 15–34 (% in 15–
34) 
 −0.732 −0.740  −3.757*** 
 (0.654) (0.657)  (0.938) 
Rural lit 15_34 x post-1993  0.241*** 0.243***  0.012 
 (0.082) (0.083)  (0.020) 
 Urban poverty (hc. ratio)  0.316*** 0.300***  0.382*** 
 (0.063) (0.064)  (0.104) 
      
Observations 973 973 973 667 667 
R-sq. (within) 0.647 0.681 0.681 0.619 0.671 
No. of districts 355 355 355 355 355 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data described in appendix S (available online at 
http://wber.oxfordjournals.org). 
 
Note: All specifications include district and state-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors (Huber-
White method) clustered at the district level in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%; all explanatory variables are lagged two years except for urban poverty 
(contemporaneous) 
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Table 2: The Effects of Urbanization on Rural Poverty, OLS, Further Robustness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. variable Rural poverty (headcount ratio) 
Period 1983–99 1983–99 1983–99 1983–99 1983–99 
      
Urban pop.t-2 (millions) −0.077***  −0.068***  
−0.039 
(0.025)  (0.024)  (0.057) 
Urban share t-2 
 −0.051    
 (0.157)    
Urban pop. of bord. districts 
(mln) 
  0.007   
  (0.057)   
Urban pop. cities >20 k 
(millions)t-2 
   −0.053**  
   (0.026)  
Urban pop.t-2 (millions)     
−0.007 
    (0.010) 
      
Basic controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Agricultural productivity YES NO NO NO NO 
Observations 762 973 965 961 973 
R-sq. (within) 0.669 0.679 0.681 0.686 0.681 
No. of districts 274 355 349 355 355 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data described in appendix S (available online at 
http://wber.oxfordjournals.org). 
 
Note: All specifications include district and state-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
(Huber-White method) clustered at the district level in parentheses; *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; all explanatory variables are lagged two years 
except for urban poverty (contemporaneous). The basic controls included are Rural pop. 
(millions), Scheduled caste (share), Rural pop 15–34 age (share), Rural lit 15–34 (% in 15–
34), Rural lit 15_34 x post-1993, Urban poverty (hc. ratio). 
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Table 3: The Effects of Urbanization on Rural Poverty, IV Estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. variable Rural poverty (headcount ratio) 
Period 1983–99 1983–99 1983–99 1983–99 1983–93 1983–93 1983–93 
        
Urban pop. 
(millions)t-2 
−0.120**
* 
−0.125**
* −0.136**  −0.231**   
(0.037) (0.046) (0.056)  (0.108)   
Urb. pop. non 
poor.t-2 (mil.) 
   
−0.089**
*    
   (0.032)    
Urban pop. 
(millions)t 
     −0.251  
     (0.197)  
Urban pop. 
(millions)t+10 
      −0.075 
      (0.106) 
        
Basic controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 926 926 846 926 620 628 628 
R-sq. (within) 0.006 0.101 0.111 0.101 0.135 0.189 0.195 
Nr. of districts 311 311 284 311 310 314 314 
First Stage        
Migrants from 
other states  
3.433*** 3.337***  3.796*** 3.307*** 3.241*** 2.342*** 
(0.488) (0.442)  (0.522) (0.444) (0.444) (0.285) 
Predicted urban 
population 
1.196*** 1.133*** 1.289*** 1.761*** 1.127*** 1.142*** 1.257*** 
(0.153) (0.146) (0.184) (0.207) (0.147) (0.150) (0.247) 
Manuf. Shr1981 x 
post1991 
  0.816**     
  (0.395)     
        
Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald F statistic 53.38 75.91 41.13 80.62 53.31 51.95 63.31 
Hansen J stat. 0.0875 0.0639 0.0448 0.286 0.524 0.635 0.007 
Chi-sq(1) P-val. 0.767 0.800 0.832 0.593 0.469 0.426 0.933 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data described in appendix S (available online at 
http://wber.oxfordjournals.org). 
 
Note: All specifications include district and state-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors (Huber-White 
method) clustered at the district level in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%; all explanatory variables are lagged two years except for urban poverty 
(contemporaneous) and the IVs of columns 6 and 7, which are contemporaneous to the endogenous variable 
(urban population). The basic controls included are Rural pop. (millions), Scheduled caste (share), Rural 
pop 15–34 age (share), Rural lit 15–34 (% in 15–34), Rural lit 15_34 x post-1993, Urban poverty (hc. ratio). 
In columns 6 and 7, the dependent variables for the years 1981 and 1991 are linearly extrapolated on the 
values for 1983 and 1987. 
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Table 4: The Effects of Urbanization on Rural Poverty, First Differences Estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method OLS OLS IV IV 
Dep. Variable Δ1993–83 Rural poverty (headcount ratio) 
     
Δ1991–81 Urban pop. 
(millions) 
−0.089 −0.109* −0.288** −0.337** 
(0.061) (0.060) (0.125) (0.141) 
     
Basic controls NO YES NO YES 
Observations 375 312 375 312 
R-sq. 0.399 0.494 −0.028 0.095 
First Stage     
     
Manuf. share in urb 
labor force in 1971 
  1.270*** 1.230*** 
  (0.225) (0.266) 
Urban density in 1971 
  0.006*** 0.004*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) 
     
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic  
 
20.62 14.34 
Hansen J stat.   1.468 2.657 
Chi-sq(1) P-val.   0.226 0.103 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data described in appendix S (available online at 
http://wber.oxfordjournals.org). 
 
Note: All specifications include district and state-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors (Huber-
White method) clustered at the district level in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%; basic controls include the share of scheduled caste in rural population; the share 
of rural population aged 15–34 years; the share of literates in rural population aged 15–34 years, and 
the latter interacted with a post-1993 dummy. Urban population is instrumented through the number of 
urban immigrants from states other than where the district is located and through the level of urban 
population predicted using the district’s share of the national urban population in 1971 and the changes 
in the national urban population. 
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Table 5: Disentangling the Economic Linkage Effects of Urbanization on Poverty 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Rur pov Rur pov AreaPC 
Nonfarm 
shr 
Intra rur-
urb mig Rice area 
Pulse 
area 
        
Urban pop. 
(millions)t-2 
−0.068*
* 0.012 
     (0.028) (0.057) 
     Urban pop. 
(millions)   
0.079* 0.016* 0.013*** 19.763** −15.227* 
  
(0.042) (0.010) (0.004) (7.991) (9.050) 
Cultivated area 
per capita t-1  
−0.071* 
     
 
(0.040) 
     Nonfarm non-HH 
share t-2  
1.212*** 
     
 
(0.376) 
     Nonfarm non-HH 
share t-2 squared  
−1.918**
* 
     
 
(0.446) 
     Intradistrict rural-
urban migrants t-2  
−1.046 
     
 
(0.673) 
     
Rice area sharet-2  
0.552** 
     
 
(0.252) 
     Rice area x urb. 
pop. (mln)t-2  
−0.300 
     
 
(0.209) 
     
Pulse area sharet-2  
0.169 
     
 
(0.187) 
     Pulse area x urb. 
pop. (mln)t-2  
−0.644 
     
 
(0.514) 
     
        Basic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Other controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 734 734 746 746 746 746 746 
Nr. of districts 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 
R-sq. (within) 0.612 0.632 0.570 0.663 0.864 0.399 0.264 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data described in appendix S (available online at 
http://wber.oxfordjournals.org). 
 
Note: Dependent variable is rural poverty; all specifications include district and state-year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors (Huber-White method) clustered at the district level in parentheses; *significant 
at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; basic controls include rural population; the share of 
scheduled caste in rural population, the share of rural population aged 15–34 years, the share of 
literates in rural population aged 15–34 years, and the latter interacted with a post-1993 dummy and the 
urban poverty rate. Other controls include all of the other extra regressors in column (2). 
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APPENDIX S1: DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 
Dependent variable: the FGT poverty measure for a given rural population is 
defined as: 
dyyf
z
yzH
Rz
R
RR )(
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
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

 −
=
α
α
    
 (A1)  
where zR  is the rural poverty line, and f(y) is the distribution function of monthly per 
capita expenditure (in this case), with the rural population ordered in ascending order 
of y (i.e. starting from the poorest). The headcount ratio is computed by setting α=0 in 
(A1), thus it represents the proportion of the population below the poverty line 
(poverty rate). However, because this measure does not capture the extent to which 
households fall short of the poverty line, we also use the poverty gap index. This is 
computed by setting α=1 and is defined as the normalised aggregate shortfall of poor 
people’s consumption from the poverty line. Both measures are increasing in poverty, 
i.e. a higher value means a higher level of poverty.  
Urban population variable: the Census 1991 (and 2001) classifies towns as 
all the statutory places with a municipality, corporation, cantonment board or notified 
town area committee, or, alternatively, places satisfying simultaneously the following 
three criteria: i) a minimum population of 5,000; ii) at least 75 per cent of male 
working population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits; and iii) a density of 
population of at least 400 per sq. Km. This is consistent with the classification of the 
1981 Census, except for condition iii), which required a minimum population density 
of 1000 per sq. Km. The year effects should anyway control for eventual problems of 
statistical consistency of urban data over time. The NSS uses the Census definition to 
classify urban vs. rural areas, thus ensuring the consistency of data across sources.  
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There were 5179 towns that met these criteria in 2001. We calculated the total 
urban population at the district level, by summing the figures for towns. Due to its 
peculiar nature, we excluded from the dataset the State of Delhi and the districts of all 
other towns with more than 3 million inhabitants in 1991(Kolkata, Chennai, 
Bangalore and Mumbai). In unreported robustness tests, we also excluded districts 
contiguous to the four megalopolises, without finding any significant change in the 
resultsWe also droppedthose observations (district-year pairs) in the top 5% of the 
distribution of the average yearly growth rate in the precedent decade. This 
corresponds to exclude observations with an yearly growth rate larger than 23%, 
which is extremely likely to be imputable to errors in the data.  
As population data are available only with a ten-year frequency (1971, 1981, 
etc.), we estimate the values for the year 1997 by non linear interpolation in order to 
conduct the analysis for three rounds of the NSS. We first estimate the yearly growth 
rate in the period 1991-1997, calculating a weighted average of the growth rate of the 
1981-1991 and 1991-2001 periods; we then calculate the 1997 population applying 
the estimated growth rate to the 1991 level.i
The number of poor urban population at time t was calculated by multiplying 
the urban poverty share at time t by the total district urban population at time t-2. We 
also built an alternative measure based on a contemporaneous (interpolated) share of 
urban poverty; as the econometric results were almost identical, we kept the first (and 
simpler) measure.  
 In this way we try to reduce the potential 
endogeneity of the urban population to rural poverty interpolated only using the 1991-
2001 growth rate. The main results are also robust to using interpolated 1997 data 
based only on the 1991-2001 growth rate (results available upon request). 
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Districts: there are 431 districts in Topalova’s (2010) original dataset, 409 of 
which have a positive urban population (at least for one of the three time periods); 
rural population figures are available for only 363 of these, therefore constituting our 
main sample of analysis; in the year 2001, this sample accounts for a total population 
of 1,000,053,152 of which 270,153,691 are urban residents, corresponding to 97% 
and 94% of the Indian total, respectively. 
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APPENDIX S2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table S2.1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables, 1983-99 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Rural poverty (share) 1,170 0.321 0.183 0.004 0.81 
Poverty gap index, rural 1,170 0.076 0.061 0 0.315 
Rural  15-34 age (share) 1,003 0.247 0.025 0.2 0.326 
Rural literates 15-34 age  
(share in 15-34) 
1,003 0.485 0.179 0.107 0.997 
Rural poors (abs. nr) 1,000 567,725 485,956 320 4,127,495 
Rural population 1,003 1,668,426 982,274 15,078 8,247,888 
Scheduled caste (share) 1,001 0.177 0.084 0 0.545 
Agr. productivity 793 0.216 0.266 0 3.261 
Urb. migr. from other states 1,007 31,098 54,077 0 545,521 
Urban population 1,200 436,497 550,895 0 4,526,745 
Urban non-poor population 1,127 354,992 479,499 0 4,119,977 
Predicted urban population 903 360,486 287,956 0 2,519,868 
Urban poverty (share) 1,131 0.255 0.178 0 0.701 
Sources: see section 4 
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APPENDIX S3: FIGURES 
 
Figure S3.1a – Urban population growth (%), 1981-97 
 
Note: the map shows the urban population growth at district level over the period 1981-1997, 
expressed as the ratio of the final value over the intial one. The values for the year 1997 are 
interpolated. The State of Delhi is excluded from the map. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Indian Census and NSS (various rounds) 
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Figure S3.1b – Poverty reduction, by district 1983-99 (% of rural pop. lifted out of 
poverty) 
 
Note: the map reports the difference between the district poverty share in 1983 and 1999. E.g., a 
value of 0.30 means that in 1983 the share of poor rural population was 30 percentage points 
bigger than in 1999. The State of Delhi is excluded from the map. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Indian Census and NSS (various rounds) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i The exact specification adopted is the following: pop(1997) =  pop(1991)*[1+yg(1981-1991)*0.3+ 
+yg(1991-2001)*0.7]6 , where yg(t-T) is the yearly growth rate of the period t-T. 
